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Response
Natalia Mari Espejo
The United Nations has encountered its share of challenges over the
course of its sixty-year history; its programs have not been consistently
successful, and individuals acting under its auspices have not always
upheld the institution’s core values. Yet multilateral cooperation is
absolutely essential, especially now, as threats to personal and international security become increasingly transnational. The power dynamic
of the United Nations demands consensus, which is problematic but
useful, because it allows countries to enjoy some level of representation while restricting the overall mandate of the United Nations. As
a result, the U.N. as an institution is severely limited in its capacity to
intervene and mediate. Coupled with recent evidence of U.N. failure, it
reinforces the need for serious structural reform. Dr. Gardiner is justified in his criticism of the U.N., but the implications of his assessment
merit further exploration. In this essay, I will first highlight the main
contributions of Gardiner’s analysis. Second, I will present a response
to his overarching criticism of the United Nations, and finally, I will
conclude by providing an alternative framework for understanding
the problems of global governance and potential U.N. restructuring.
*****
Dr. Gardiner’s critique of the United Nations addresses three key
issues: accountability, responsibility, and leadership. The failure of the
U.N. in these areas thematically supports the crux of his argument, as
he maintains that poor leadership and constant corruption have consistently plagued the institution throughout its tenure as the world’s
sole organ of global governance. The concerns Gardiner raises certainly deserve greater attention. The peacekeeping atrocities in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Oil-for-Food scandal represent
significant institutional failures. In both cases, the United Nations interfered with national politics without properly preparing itself. Additionally, as with many peacekeeping operations, U.N. troops entered
the Congolese conflict without proper training and repeatedly failed
in their objectives, as the lack of oversight structures limited the extent
to which the United Nations could punish individuals who exploited
their position as peacekeepers to victimize the populations they were
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supposedly protecting.1 The U.N. has without question been deficient
in its institutionalization of accountability measures. It is also clear that
the organization has failed to play a consistent leadership role as evidenced by the Rwanda and Bosnia cases.
Gardiner correctly identifies the United States as the world’s only
superpower, and as a result, he makes a serious argument in favor
of its diplomatic superiority. His analysis of the United States’ role in
international affairs is accurately grounded in a realist framework,
and describes an often-ignored geopolitical perspective. Furthermore,
his discussion of the U.S.’s hegemony establishes the sole remaining
superpower as the presumptive leader on issues of international concern. As the world’s most economically and militarily developed country, the United States is without question an important player on the
international stage.
Gardiner’s historical analysis highlights many of the U.N.’s significant shortcomings, and is to a degree successful in undermining its
credibility. It would be naïve to assert that the United Nations is a
corruption-free organization that holds a perfect human rights record.
However, Gardiner’s argument leaves several important questions
unanswered because it does not situate U.N. failures within the context of inter-state politics. The organization’s membership consists of
free states that have agreed to enter into voluntary association with one
another. To date, the United Nations is, therefore, severely restricted in
its capacity to create and enforce binding initiatives. As a result, the
U.N. is in many cases structurally incapable of legally monitoring and
controlling the actions of its member states.
*****
The following section delves into two of Dr. Gardiner’s most important
examples: the Oil-for-Food and the Congo Peacekeeping scandals. The
gross misappropriation of funds that characterized the execution of the
United Nation’s Oil-for-Food program certainly represents a significant U.N. failure. The fact that Saddam Hussein directly profited from
permitted oil sales demonstrates that the program’s designers did not
sufficiently consider the risk of malfeasance. However, I am hesitant to
concur with Gardiner’s allegation of internalized corruption. To start,
the United Nations cannot be held accountable for the illicit sale of
crude oil to Syria, Turkey, and Jordan, because these transactions took
place without U.N. supervision and in direct opposition to binding
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economic sanctions. The Senate subcommittee investigation into the
Oil-for-Food scandal confirms this fact as it discovered that Hussein’s
biggest profits came from similar transactions that also eluded the
U.N.’s accountability checks.2
Clearly, the U.N. should invest in more effective oversight structures to prevent future misconduct. However, several factors contributed to the Oil-for-Food scandal, most of which were out of the United
Nations’ control. To illustrate, Saddam Hussein exploited the ever-sacrosanct right to sovereignty, which is enshrined in the U.N. Charter,3
to ensure that he, as his country’s only executive, remained personally
in charge of negotiating all aspects of the oil contract permitted under
the Oil-for-Food program. This flexibility allowed him to manipulate
negotiations and evade oversight.
One might note at this point that the right to sovereignty has been
similarly invoked by the United States and its leaders as a sound reason for rejecting the ratification of the Rome Statute (calling for the creation of an International Criminal Court), the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (a treaty
that has been ratified by every member of the General Assembly with
the exception of the United States and Somalia; the latter having no
recognized national government and as a result is functionally incapable of ratifying the Convention4). Furthermore, the failures of the
Oil-for-Food program are more representative of problems related to
corruption within specific member states, and do not reflect a case of
internalized misconduct. Gardiner’s examples prove that the U.N. is
occasionally unsuccessful in its attempts to monitor the behavior of its
member states, which signals the need for greater oversight but does
not fundamentally undermine the need for U.N. intervention.
*****
Dr. Gardiner is correct to criticize the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) peacekeeping operation, as its execution severely undermined
the United Nations’ mission. However, the fact that U.N. peacekeepers
exploited their positions of power does not fundamentally challenge
the conceptual validity of peacekeeping. Even if U.N. responses to
internal displacement and civil wars carry unexpected consequences,
the alternative of ignoring genocide and human rights violations will
inevitably produce an unacceptable pattern of inaction.
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The U.N.’s definition of peacekeeping is by no means concrete. As
the institution encounters newly emerging conflicts, U.N. peacekeepers are often tasked with bringing stability to countries that are in a
state of chaos. Peacekeeping has proven to be such a challenge that the
United Nations has authorized the use of force in recent conflicts in
the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.5 The legal infrastructure of the United Nations is far from adequate.6 Allegations of
egregious human rights abuses are generally addressed through an ad
hoc evaluative process.7 My intent here is not to excuse the behavior of
U.N. peacekeepers during the Congo operation, but rather to explore
the structural factors that contributed to the organization’s failed oversight.
*****
As a prominent member of the United Nations, the United States,
like its French and British counterparts, enjoys a global position of
privilege. Unfortunately, the United States uses its military and economic superiority to further the goal of isolationism instead of productive multilateralism. The U.S. has recently all but ignored the U.N.
on issues like the Iraq War and the conflict in Israel. While Gardiner’s
description of the U.S. certainly establishes it as a global power, it does
little to explain why the United States should enjoy any credibility as
an effective and cooperative member of the global community.
The U.S. is in absolutely no position to fill the void that would be
left in the absence of the United Nations. Recent events at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prove that even the U.S. Army is incapable of
fully controlling the behavior of its recruits. Fortunately, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice stipulates that individuals who commit crimes
during humanitarian interventions must be tried and appropriately
punished.8 U.N. peacekeepers, however, cannot be similarly sanctioned. This signals a more complicated problem within the United
Nations relating specifically to the issue of accountability. The nuances
that characterize the legal history of the United Nations are especially
problematic when it comes to the issue of peacekeeping. Because the
United Nations is not a sovereign country, “it is not bound by the Conventions relating to the law of armed conflict, except in cases where
the Conventions represent international customary law.”9 Since peacekeepers technically are impartial third parties, they are not bound by
documents like the Geneva Conventions, which establish a set of rules
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for war.10 Peacekeeping as a concept is thus idealized to assume a neutral and non-violent meaning. Traditional acts of war cannot be conflated with peacekeeping operations that, at least in spirit, exist only
to quell acts of genocide. Therefore, peacekeepers remain as legally
ambiguous subjects. Despite acting in a pseudo-military capacity,
peacekeeping forces do not engage in war as it is traditionally defined.
Their stated purpose is to establish and maintain the peace. However,
because they intervene in what I will tentatively call an extra-national
capacity, legally monitoring their activity is a challenge. Humanitarian
law is restricted in its applicability to inter-state conflict, which leaves
little room for the consideration of international agents.11 Thus, while
Dr. Gardiner is unequivocally correct in his criticism of the criminal
acts that were committed in the Congo, assigning responsibility to
the peacekeepers’ countries of origin oversimplifies and does little to
address what has become a legal quandary.
U.S. criticism of the U.N., particularly as it is articulated in Gardiner’s essay, fails to analyze the institution’s structural shortcomings and
focuses instead on finding justifications for making it irrelevant. Considering the current geopolitical reality that characterizes inter-state
interactions, this perspective is very dangerous.
*****
The United Nations, despite its shortcomings, is the only institution in
existence that facilitates international political cooperation. No other
organ exists that is capable of bringing together the governments of
the world to discuss issues like genocide, human trafficking, and the
global AIDS crisis. Thus, in the next part of this article, I will articulate
a defense of the United Nations and offer a set of solutions to the current problems facing global governance today.
Initially, I would like to turn to the work of Seth Jones and James
Dobbins who explore the history of the United Nations, particularly as
it relates to nation-building efforts. Their conclusions are unexpected,
considering the organization’s recent bad press, but are supported by
sound logic and careful sociopolitical observation. The authors’ argument presents the United Nations as the organization most capable of
addressing problems relating to inter-state disputes and transnational
security threats. Their analysis is particularly compelling because it
is couched in a broader discussion of nation-building efforts, and the
relative successes and failures of states and other institutions since the
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end of the Second World War. Interestingly, Jones and Dobbins focus
on the success of United Nations’ efforts relative to those of other states
and institutions. Thus, they avoid the question: Is the United Nations
fully solvent? Instead they ask: How successful has the United Nations
been in comparison to the available alternatives? By answering the latter, Jones and Dobbins establish a clear pattern of U.N. success, which
is not necessarily evidenced by the eradication of all conflict, but rather
noticeable improvements in the midst of internal disputes and humanitarian crises. As examples, the authors cite the cases of East Timor and
Eastern Slovenia, two conflicts that pale in comparison to the events
that transpired in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but
that nonetheless underscore some of the United Nations’ most important functions. These case studies are particularly interesting because of
their size. Both Eastern Slovenia and East Timor are small geographic
spaces with moderately sized populaces, unlike the DRC, Bosnia, and
Rwanda. In both countries, U.N. peacekeeping operations successfully
oversaw the development and eventual dissolution of transitional governments, disarmed combatants, and established new security forces
while keeping the peace.12
These illustrative cases demonstrate that one of the biggest problems
facing the United Nations relates very integrally to scale.13 The fact that
the U.N. is substantially more successful in small countries speaks
volumes about the organization’s military and economic capabilities.
Jones and Dobbins explain that in the cases of the DRC and Rwanda,
the U.N. lacked the necessary military and economic resources to
execute a successful and consolidated peacekeeping operation. Poorly
trained troops and finite resources ultimately contributed to the organization’s failure, which is clearly articulated in Gardiner’s essay. However, his criticism falls short because it generalizes logistical failures in
an attempt to discredit the United Nations as an institution.14 Furthermore, Jones and Dobbins conclude that the U.N. has been significantly
more successful than others at addressing intra-state conflicts, largely
because of its perceived neutrality, despite the resource and decisionmaking restrictions imposed by the Security Council. Yet Dobbins and
Jones stop short of actually lauding U.N. missions for their success,
as they argue that they, “tend to be undermanned and under-funded
and are frequently staffed and led subject to the expectation of unrealistic best-case scenarios.”15 The real problem is specifically related
to resources and, unfortunately, “member states are rarely willing to
commit the troops, police, or money any prudent military commander

66

Natalia Mari Espejo

would desire.”16 Excuses will certainly do little to undo the damage
caused by failed U.N. interventions, however the fact remains that U.N.
missions more often than not are the best possible option in a world of
nonexistent alternatives. To clarify, “U.N. peacekeeping operations are
often described as having been ‘born of necessity.”’17 They are treated
as inexpensive alternatives to what is traditionally considered armed
intervention.
Currently peacekeeping operations function in a predominantly ad
hoc capacity. As conflicts develop, the Security Council debates the
potential benefits and consequences of intervention before deciding
whether or not to commit peacekeeping forces.18 Additionally, the
United Nations must secure the support of the host country prior to
the deployment of any peacekeeping operation.19 The enumerated
guidelines do indeed function as a framework for executing peacekeeping operations. However, the U.N. has yet to develop a structure
that would facilitate the identification of conflicts that might require
intervention. Consequently, it is often geopolitics that determines who
intervenes and where.20 The Cold War is a particularly obvious example of how the United Nations can be rendered irrelevant in its capacity as a peacekeeper due to the political and economic interests of the
Security Council.21
U.N. operations represent the concentrated contribution of individual states. In the absence of effective internal oversight structures,
the United Nations is forced to rely on the screening mechanisms of its
members. In addition, the United States has been historically hesitant
about contributing troops to peacekeeping operations, which gives
the U.N. the choice of either ignoring genocide and violent political
conflicts, or doing its best with the available resources. Resolving this
tension would require member states to accept a form of restricted sovereignty that could empower the United Nations to develop, fund, and
deploy military operations. The Eastern Slovenia and East Timor cases
prove that the U.N. is capable of successfully keeping the peace when
it has access to the necessary resources. The U.N.’s current division
of power limits the scope of peacekeeping for two reasons. First, the
imperative for Security Council consensus forces the United Nations
to justify intervention as ethnic conflict and genocide occurs, which
means some loss of life for the sake of the deliberative process. Second,
the veto power of the five permanent members necessarily politicizes
responses to humanitarian crises. The current makeup of the Security
Council allows the victors of the Second World War to determine the
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United Nation’s agenda. This power dynamic functionally removes the
members of the General Assembly from the decision-making processes
that determine global politics.
During the Rwandan genocide, for example, the African perspective
was left out of discussions regarding potential intervention, with the
exception of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who participated as a nonvoting member. The United Nations failed to intervene in Rwanda,
and millions lost their lives as a consequence. However, the world’s
powerful governments had the opportunity to demand international
intervention and also demurred.
*****
Dr. Gardiner’s essay explores several U.N. failures. His discussion
falls short of actually discrediting the institution, however, because
it does not conceptually problematize its changing role in the context of contemporary international relations. Security threats are no
longer restricted by fixed geographic borders and actually transcend
the boundaries imposed by a strictly realist interpretation of international politics. Globalization and its political and economic consequences have created a situation in which it is functionally impossible
to reduce global governance to inter-state politics. There now exists a
set of “global” problems that affects countries regardless of their geopolitical importance. The United Nations is the only institution that
addresses issues related to development, health, and the environment
in their proper global contexts, because it considers, at least in some
capacity, the perspectives of the entire international community. While
the United Nations, like all bureaucracies, is plagued by administrative
and structural problems, it remains as a site of dialogue, compromise,
and cooperation.
The questions raised by Dr. Gardiner, although almost completely
valid, are predominantly logistical. Robust funding initiatives, a
restructuring of the Security Council, and an acceptance of restricted
sovereignty would go a long way towards facilitating the creation of a
more effective United Nations. Until then, the United Nations must do
what it can to address issues like genocide, civil war, climate change,
famine, and human trafficking, even if its efforts achieve less than perfect results, because the alternatives are indifference, militant unilateralism, and inaction.
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5. Tittemore, p. 2.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Myers, p. 1.
9. Bialke, p. 13.
10. Ibid.
11. Bialke, p. 13.
12. Jones and Dobbins, p. 4.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Jones and Dobbins, p. 7.
16. Ibid.
17. Tittemore, p. 5.
18. Ibid., p. 5.
19. Ibid.
20. Bialke, p. 3.
21. Ibid.

Bibliography
Bialke, Major Joseph. “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Applicable Norms and
the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict.” The Air Force Law Review. 2001.
Jones, Seth, and James Dobbins. “Symposium: U.N. Reform: The U.N.’s Record on Peacekeeping.” Chicago Journal of International Law. Winter 2006.
Labott, Elise, and Brian Hirschkom. “Documents: U.S. Condoned Iraq Oil Smuggling.”
Accessed online at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/02/iraq.oil.smuggle.
Myers, Steven. “Judging Abu Ghraib: Why Military Justice can Seem Unjust.” The New
York Times. 6 June 2004.
Tittemore, Brian. “Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian
Law to United Nations Peace Operations.” Stanford Journal of International Law. Winter,
1997.
United Nations Charter, online at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. Accessed on 9
September 2006.
UNICEF, online at http://www.tsunamigeneration.org/crc/index_30229.html. Accessed
on 7 September 2006.

69

